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Abstract
In May 2018, the process which may ultimately lead to the negotiation of a legally bind-
ing Global Pact for the environment formally commenced under the auspices of the United 
Nations General Assembly. Expectations for the Pact are high, evidenced in particular by 
its multiple and overlapping objectives: to serve as a generic binding instrument of inter-
national environmental law (IEL) principles; to integrate, consolidate, unify and ultimately 
entrench many of the fragmented principles of IEL; and to constitute the first global envi-
ronmental human rights instrument. In the wake of the impending intergovernmental pro-
cess, the paper offers a thorough critique of the draft Pact in its present iteration. We do 
so with the aim of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the present draft Pact by 
interrogating: (a) its diplomatic and symbolic relevance and possible unique contribution 
at the policy level to global environmental law and governance, and (b) its potential at the 
operational level of IEL and global environmental governance, focusing on the extent to 
which the draft Pact accommodates both existing and more recent rules and principles for 
environmental protection. As the Pact’s primary ambition is to become a universally bind-
ing global treaty, it would be churlish not to recognise its potential for innovation, as well 
as the considerable opportunity that the negotiation of the Pact will have to generate broad-
sweeping and positive impacts. However, our central thesis is that only if the Global Pact 
were to incorporate ambitious normative provisions to strengthen those public and private 
global governance efforts that aim to halt the deterioration of Earth system integrity, as 
well as to maintain and improve integrity, will it be able to offer a firm foundation of the 
type of Anthropocene Law, termed here as the Lex Anthropocenae, required to confront 
head-on the deep socio-ecological crisis of the Anthropocene.
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1 Introduction
In June 2017, the Global Pact for the Environment (Global Pact) was presented to the world 
in Paris with considerable fanfare and to significant media and broader public attention 
by the French think tank, Le Club de Juristes, which also coordinated its drafting process 
(World Commission on Environmental Law 2017). The final outcome of a relatively swift 
process that consisted of five consultations, the Pact was drafted by a Group of Experts1: 
a network of over 100 lawyers representing almost 40 nationalities and chaired by Laurent 
Fabius, the president of Climate Change COP21, the current President of the French Con-
stitutional Council, and recently appointed United Nations (UN) Environment Patron on 
Environmental Governance.
The Pact’s objectives seem to be three-pronged: (1) to be a globally binding environ-
mental law instrument; (2) to thus entrench all major principles of international environ-
mental law (IEL) in one document; while also (3) developing progressively the law to 
provide a globally recognised right to live in an ecologically sound environment, with 
associated procedural environmental rights. The Pact also includes, inter alia, references 
to long-standing principles of IEL such as prevention, precaution and sustainable develop-
ment, as well as the inclusion of newer principles such as resilience, non-regression and the 
role of non-state actors and subnational entities in environmental governance.
Expectations for the Pact are clearly high, as evidenced by the explicit support of the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), which has observer and consulta-
tive status at the UN, as well as by the support of French President Emmanuel Macron, 
who has resolved to “push the Pact through the United Nations General Assembly” (Le 
1 As a draft text adopted by a broad consultative process, its present status and an authoritative source 
for its existence are difficult to formalise into traditional citation. The authors used the text available at: 
http://pacte nviro nment .emedi aweb.fr/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2017/07/Globa l-Pact-for-the-Envir onmen t-proje 
ct-24-June-2017.pdf. Accessed 24 September 2018. It features in the bibliography as “Le Club de Juristes 
(2017b)”.
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Club de Juristes 2017a: 8). France convened a “launch summit” as a side event to the high-
level segment of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 19 September 
2017, which led to France and supporting nations to bring forward a draft resolution to the 
UNGA. On 10 May 2018, the resolution was adopted by the UNGA (143 votes in favour, 
6 against and 6 abstentions)2 (UNGA 2018). The stage is now set for states and other 
stakeholders to begin the process to consider the draft text with a view—so its supporters 
hope—of negotiating and adopting a final instrument. In particular, the resolution estab-
lished an ad hoc open-ended working group to consider the matter (UNGA 2018: para. 
2), to be guided especially by a “technical and evidence-based” report from the UN Secre-
tary-General on “possible gaps in international environmental law and environment-related 
instruments” (UNGA 2018: para. 1). At an organisational session held in September 2018, 
it was announced that the Secretary-General’s report would be received in November 2018 
and that the working group would then meet at least three further times in 2019 to consider 
recommendations for next steps for the UNGA, which could include convening an inter-
governmental conference to adopt a Global Pact (Lebada 2018).
In the wake of the impending political, diplomatic and legal processes to negotiate, 
refine, agree and possibly adopt the final text, we offer a critique of the draft Pact in its 
present iteration (see also Raith 2018; Biniaz 2017; Burger et al. 2018). We do so with the 
aim of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the Pact by interrogating: (a) its diplo-
matic and symbolic relevance and possible unique contribution at the policy level to global 
environmental law and governance (evidenced by the nomenclature of the “Pact” itself), 
and (b) its potential at the operational level of IEL and global environmental governance, 
focusing on the extent to which the draft Pact accommodates both existing and more recent 
rules and principles for environmental protection that are crystallising in treaty law, soft 
law and jurisprudence.
Throughout, we critically reflect on the extent to which the Pact contains the type of 
provisions that must respond to the socio-ecological crisis of the Anthropocene epoch in 
accordance with the dictates of an intertwined Earth system (Lewis and Maslin 2015). The 
Anthropocene Working Group recently concluded that there is probably convincing evi-
dence to formalize the use of the term Anthropocene in the near future as the name for the 
new human-dominated geological epoch (Zalasiewicz et al. 2017: 59). Yet, formalised or 
not, the Anthropocene:
…is not simply a neutral characterisation of a new geological epoch, but it is also a 
particular way of understanding the world and a normative guide to action. It is … 
more usefully understood as an ideology – in that it provides the ideational underpin-
ning for a particular view of the world, which it, in turn, helps to legitimate. (Baskin 
2015: 10–11 (emphasis added))
With reference to the Anthropocene’s potentially far-reaching normative consequences, 
we agree with Dalby that “[T]he future configuration of the Earth System is now the key 
matter of geopolitics, of how the world is known, reorganized and rebuilt in the strug-
gles for economic and political mastery in rapidly changing circumstances” (Dalby 2016: 
34) and believe that a globally binding instrument such as the Pact might play a poten-
tially significant normative and broader governance role navigating humanity through the 
Anthropocene.
2 The States voting against were Iran, Philippines, Russia Federation, Syria, Turkey and the USA, whilst 
the States abstaining were Belarus, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Tajikistan.
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We commence the discussion in Part 2 below by broadly reflecting on the diplomatic, 
political and symbolic relevance of the Pact. We do so in particular by first discussing 
the possible message its drafters hoped to convey by designating it as a “pact” and not a 
“treaty”, a “convention” or an “agreement”. We then investigate one of the major objec-
tives of the Pact, namely to strengthen the coherence of IEL by addressing fragmentation. 
The following section critiques the Pact’s singular “environmental” focus and its failure to 
embrace an Earth system approach to IEL and global environmental governance, while the 
discussion also critically interrogates the related issue of the Pact’s anthropocentric ontol-
ogy. This part concludes with a discussion of a major potential drawback of the Pact in its 
present form: uncertainty with respect to its nature, form and purpose.
Part 3 forms the bulk of the discussion. Here we dissect in some detail and critique the 
provisions of the Pact, reflecting throughout on how far the text reflects recent develop-
ments or provides for any novel provisions, and thus the extent to which the provisions 
aspire to conform to, innovate and/or strengthen existing IEL.
We conclude the discussion in Part 4 with a critical reflection on whether the Pact 
presents a firm foundation for inaugurating or constituting the type of paradigm-shifting 
global juridical regime that we critically need in the Anthropocene (Lex Anthropocenae), 
or whether the Pact in its present form is a stillborn initiative and lost opportunity. We 
acknowledge that notwithstanding the limitations of a “paper” Pact, and that implementa-
tion is invariably pivotal (UNGA 2018: para. 1),3 an ambitious legally binding treaty is still 
hugely valuable, but only if it is appropriate. Our central thesis, however, is that only if the 
Global Pact were to provide normative provisions to strengthen those public and private 
global governance efforts that aim to halt the deterioration of Earth system integrity, as 
well as to maintain and even improve integrity, will it be able to offer a firm foundation of 
the type of Anthropocene Law, termed here as the Lex Anthropocenae, required to confront 
head-on the deep socio-ecological crisis of the Anthropocene (Kotzé 2017).
2  Diplomatic, political and symbolic relevance
In global (environmental) governance, symbolism might not necessarily lead to concrete 
results, but symbolism is important nevertheless, especially at a diplomatic and political 
level.
As Caldwell and Weiland state with reference to the World Charter for Nature of 1982 
(WCN) (itself an instrument adopted by the UNGA but which, beyond its initial proclama-
tion, has not again featured prominently in or exerted any significant norm-shaping influ-
ence on global environmental governance):
… [it remains a] significant symbolic expression of a hope among nations to achieve 
a more harmonious and sustainable relationship between humanity and the rest of 
the biosphere … Symbolic expression is an important element in the development of 
public and international policy; it sets the context within which operational strategies 
and programs are developed. (Caldwell and Weiland 1996: 100)
What then is the symbolic, political and diplomatic relevance of the Pact?
3 The report to be submitted to the Secretary-General, though its principal purpose is to identify and assess 
“possible gaps”, is to written within the broader context of “with a view to strengthening their implementa-
tion”.
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2.1  The solemnity of a pact
In determining the Global Pact’s potential importance, one needs to consider the mes-
sage that its drafters hoped to convey. It is significant that it has not been framed as a 
“declaration” like the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972 or the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, a deliberate attempt to con-
vey a specific normative message, to influence global perceptions and to avoid from the 
outset the pitfalls of ethically weak soft normativity generally associated with non-bind-
ing soft law declarations. After all, specifically as a result of the non-binding nature of 
the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, the impetus behind drafting the Pact was to offer 
a binding “international treaty establishing the fundamental principles of environmental 
law” in response to the “strong expectation from the legal community to see the founda-
tions of environmental regulation systematised in a single instrument at an international 
level” (Le Club de Juristes 2017a: 23).
In pursuit of such binding normativity, the draft text is instead fashioned around the 
idea of a pact; an agreement espoused as a solemn promise without reservation among 
like-minded states that share common concerns whereby they purposively commit to 
undertake specific actions to achieve a certain objective to their mutual benefit. The 
word “pact”, which has specific connotations, is a deliberate designation, we would sug-
gest, and is reminiscent of related terms such as charters and covenants, which have 
been employed elsewhere in the past in attempts to respond to similar existential cri-
ses by imbuing global agreements with a distinct higher-order, ethically grounded, and 
universally binding character that imposes not only legal but also moral obligations on 
states, while announcing sweeping ethically driven paradigmatic changes in a way that 
pacts, covenants and charters typically aim to do (Nicholls 2010). Acknowledging the 
transactional nature of many international treaties, the term “pact”—alongside other 
terms such as “charter”—seeks to signify something of significance, while also conceal-
ing that the international community has no other method, or form, of explicit environ-
mental law-making (French and Scott 2018).
The possibly unique moral, political, diplomatic and ultimately juridical signifi-
cance of the Global Pact’s designation as such is illustrated through analogy by the 
USA’ insistence on not designating the Rio Declaration during its negotiation phase as 
a charter, but instead as a declaration, believing that “the name ‘Charter’ raised unreal-
istic expectations about the document’s legal content” (Kovar 1993: 123). Engel further 
highlights the special nature and significant (if often symbolic and abstract) importance 
of such instruments:
The image of covenant, and the rich constellation of ethical meanings that flow 
from it, have the greatest potential of enabling us to see the ‘majesty and tragedy’ 
of our contemporary global situation, as well as to coordinate the insights of other 
images of our moral condition … The making of covenants is one of the oldest 
and most enduring ways in which human beings have established social relations 
founded on shared values and purposes. (Engel 2004: 3)
The United Nations Charter of 1945, which quite literally introduced a new world 
order, is such an instrument. Others are the (binding) International Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights and on Economic Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, while the 
WCN and the Earth Charter of 2000 offer prominent soft law examples in the environ-
mental domain (Bosselmann and Engel 2010). The word “pact” more specifically has 
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already occurred in similar high-level and aspirational agreements that have sought to 
announce a watershed moment in international relations, such as the Pact of Bogotá 
of 1948 (officially known as the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement) aimed at the 
peaceful settlement of disputes in the Pacific region, and the Kellogg–Briand Pact of 
1928 (officially known as the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument 
of National Policy).
To this end, the obvious advantage of adopting a pact for global environmental law and 
governance arguably lies in the possibility that it could infuse largely Western-driven prin-
ciples with an ethics-based, more representative, democratic, and thus legitimate global 
representation, not only of global civil society and state interests, but also of the myriad 
moral and ethical values they and other stakeholders collectively hold dear, including the 
collective obligations they have towards care for the Earth system. There is some evidence 
in the draft wording that this was consciously attempted. Leaning towards the approach of 
the global civil society-driven Earth Charter, the invocation of “pact” also seeks to broaden 
the diplomatic relevance and application of the Global Pact to non-state actors to the extent 
that it recognises: “[T]he Parties shall take the necessary measures to encourage the imple-
mentation of this Pact by non-State actors and subnational entities, including civil society, 
economic actors, cities and regions taking into account their vital role in the protection of 
the environment” (draft article 14), a complex and, in many respects, novel intervention 
bolstered by the fact that this initial version of the Pact emerged from civil society, as it 
has been drafted by non-state actors outside of the formal state-centred treaty-making sys-
tem. In theory at least, this could result in the Pact being grounded in an orientation that 
transcends the realm of the purely state-based concerns that treaties invariably pursue, by 
instead seeking innovatively to accommodate (if not necessarily to impose) principles and 
provisions that states would not of their own volition normally include in treaty provisions. 
Whether this is the case is investigated below.
2.2  Innovatively consolidating international environmental law?
While the Pact’s primary ambition is to become a universally binding global treaty, it 
would be churlish not to recognise its potential for innovation, and indeed, the consider-
able opportunity that the negotiation of the Pact will have to generate broad-sweeping and 
positive impacts. As noted earlier, it aims to integrate, consolidate, unify and ultimately 
entrench the fragmented principles of IEL. It is envisaged that the Pact “should strengthen 
the coherence of global governance of the environment, currently characterized by the 
fragmentation of international institutions and the multiplication of international environ-
mental norms both technical and sectoral” (Le Club de Juristes 2017a: 8). To this end, such 
integration might itself be beneficial if it leads to an instrument that consolidates the lead-
ing principles of IEL into one overarching framework treaty that acts as a collective, single 
and authoritative reference point. And, as noted below, there is also some evidence of a 
certain amount of progressive development in the principles included. Thus, setting aside 
for the moment the question whether the present text is, on the one hand, attempting to be 
too ambitious or, on the other, perceived as not being ambitious enough, there are many 
who are prepared to accept the potential value in and of itself of seeking to adopt such a 
treaty, recognising also its potential to provide clearer direction for treaty interpreters to 
achieve systemic integration in public international law (Young 2018).
On reflection, and with some hesitation, we remain unconvinced. At a deeper, regu-
latory level, there is little conclusive evidence that addressing fragmentation in such a 
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way will necessarily improve the overall effectiveness of global environmental govern-
ance in any aggregated sense (Kotzé 2014). It has been pointed out, for example, that 
fragmentation might actually be a desirable characteristic of global environmental law 
and governance for various reasons: because Earth system challenges are very diverse; 
because a one-size-fits-all governance approach is not compatible with Earth system 
complexities; because current IEL approaches and multilateral environmental agree-
ments (MEAs) have been designed in a nuanced manner tailor-made for a specific issue 
area and its challenges; and because fragmented IEL regimes are considered on balance 
to be more flexible, reflexive and adaptive while allowing for innovation (Biniaz 2017: 
2, cf Gupta and Sanchez 2012). If nothing else, a rush to codification for the purpose of 
integration should be carefully weighed up, as it is not invariably a “good” outcome in 
all situations.
Moreover, it is all but impossible for the Global Pact to provide for, and thus consoli-
date, all of the principles, provisions and institutions of IEL in one document. And if, as 
it does, it focuses only on consolidating the key principles of IEL with a view to also pro-
moting legal certainty and normative clarity and consistency, it may be beneficial for that 
reason—in terms of its internal logic—but it will fail to address the underlying and deeply 
seated structural causes of the fragmentation of global environmental governance, such as 
the fact that environmental governance is by its very nature sectoralised (climate, water, 
forests, oceans, etc.) and governed by issue-specific treaties providing for specialised treaty 
governance bodies. There is no single global environmental government in the strict sense, 
with no prospect that such an organisation will emerge anytime soon. The United Nations 
Environment Assembly (UNEA)—as the now universalised global decision-making forum 
at the head of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)—remains far from 
playing such a role. Ultimately, unless the Global Pact pursues its consolidation ambitions 
in tandem with efforts to strengthen global environmental governance, it will not improve 
the effectiveness of IEL overall. A similar argument could be made in terms of reforms to 
environmental dispute settlement (French forthcoming).
With respect to the novelty of its consolidation objective, such a project has of course 
already been pursued by the (non-binding) IUCN Draft International Covenant on Envi-
ronment and Development of 1994, itself in part a response to the international commu-
nity’s own half-hearted conviction that such an endeavour is necessary (see, for instance, 
paragraphs 38 and 39 of Agenda 21). The IUCN Draft Covenant is intended to be “a blue-
print for an international framework (or umbrella) agreement consolidating and developing 
existing legal principles related to environment and development” [IUCN 1994 (5th edn. 
2015)]. If the ambition is merely to have a binding document that consolidates all major 
existing principles of IEL, states could simply revert to the IUCN Draft Covenant, which 
has been carefully developed over many years, and convert the Covenant into a binding 
instrument. This would serve the purpose of having a binding consolidating instrument 
for bindingness’ sake, recognising that bindingness in form and bindingness in content are 
asymmetrical and that the former is not inherently to be preferred. Bindingness in itself, 
however, does not invariably improve environmental quality and the effectiveness of IEL, 
as it would not necessarily address the root causes of inadequate environmental protection, 
and it would miss an opportunity to meaningfully cater for associated but critically impor-
tant considerations that have a bearing on the level of environmental protection, such as 
financial and technical assistance, capacity-building and institutional governance support 
(Biniaz 2017: 9). If the intention is (also) to provide for innovative, ethical and potentially 
more effective IEL provisions in a consolidated binding instrument, then future efforts at 
negotiation will instead have to focus on content and on adopting the type of provisions 
818 L. J. Kotzé, D. French 
1 3
that are fit for purpose in the epoch of the Anthropocene, a matter to which we return in 
Part 3 below.
2.3  “What’s in a name?”
While the use of the term “Pact” can be supported for the reasons outlined above, the 
choice of “Environment” as the Pact’s descriptor, though seemingly innocuous, is not 
uncontentious for two principal reasons. First, both as a matter of regulatory conceptualism 
and epistemic value and utility, criticism can be increasingly levelled against the idea of 
“environmental protection”, which has traditionally included—yet separated out—distinc-
tive aspects such as wildlife conservation, pollution control and waste management often 
in a haphazard way that ignores not only ecological complexity but also important social 
(human) relations and their interactions. In tandem with more daring epistemological 
endeavours urging us to rethink “environmental” problems in more encompassing, recipro-
cally interconnected and holistic ways, there is increasingly a case to be made in support 
of discarding the term “environment” (and its accompanying terminological baggage of 
“sustainable development”) on the grounds that the term has a chequered history and has 
gradually become unable semantically, conceptually and epistemically to respond to cur-
rent demands.
Instead, new epistemologies urge a perspective centred on the Earth system that requires 
integrated modes of polycentric, reflexive and multi-scalar global law and governance 
alongside a systems approach (Biermann 2014). We would strongly argue for the necessity 
to future-proof the Pact, and to recognise an altogether more integrated systems approach 
that is fit for purpose, and which is expressed through contemporary concepts and ideas 
that act as epistemic lenses, incorporating the contribution of concepts such as planetary 
boundaries, Earth system governance and the Anthropocene. From a legal perspective, this 
would lead one to begin to talk about Earth system law, moving towards a Lex Anthro-
pocenae, which hints at a transformed type of law grounded in and focused on the entire 
Earth, while promoting positive notions of the rule of ecological law, a transformed sense 
of global democracy, global ecological citizenship and the rights of nature; all collectively 
institutionalised within a new model of Earth system stewardship and governance (Bos-
selmann 2016).
The Earth system perspective is therefore not concerned only with discrete environmen-
tal concerns, but more broadly with all aspects of a deeply intertwined Earth system, of 
which human beings are only one part, including the myriad complex intertwined socio-
ecological aspects of the Earth system. The inherently linked interdependence and reci-
procity between people and Earth that are expressed through a systems approach would, we 
believe, have strengthened the symbolism of the promise of a Pact, while at once affirming 
the Anthropocene’s central thesis that insists:
Humanity and nature are one, embedded from within the recent geological record. 
This is the core premise of the Anthropocene thesis, heralding a potentially far-reach-
ing paradigm shift in the natural sciences as well as providing new models for think-
ing about culture, politics, and everyday interactions. (Haus der Kulturen der Welt 
2013)
Had it incorporated a systems approach in its name and its provisions, the Pact would 
also have been better aligned with insights and perspectives emerging from within the UN 
itself; an increasing realisation that new concepts need to influence the shape, content and 
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purpose of global environmental law and governance. For example, as recently as in 2014 
the UNGA proclaimed that: “[E]arth system science has paved the way for Earth system 
governance, Earth-based law and Earth-based economics …. Each of these evolutionary 
changes, individually and together, point to a new path for us to ensure the well-being of 
the planet and its people”. (UNGA 2014: para. 12) While it does not do so in its present 
form, if revised, the Pact might be the ideal normative vehicle to announce and usefully 
carry the Earth system perspective through the global environmental policy, normative, 
institutional and political architecture.
Second, from an ethical point of view and underlying the prevailing anthropocen-
tric approach in international environmental law, “environment” is a term that is central 
to other instruments within the field, such as the Rio and Stockholm Declarations, both 
of which have been unsuccessful in juridically extending greater care to the non-human 
world. In these instruments and in other contexts, “environment” has the potential to rel-
egate non-human entities to an objectified, purely utilitarian and commodified status, 
homogenised, in passive form, for human use and survival, which consequently also serves 
as the only reason to protect non-human life. While we do not suggest these instruments 
have been unsuccessful solely because of their reference to “environment”, and while states 
are undoubtedly more inclined to support instruments with less ecocentric content, we do 
believe that the use of words such as “nature” or “Earth” that the WCN and the Earth 
Charter instead employ, imparts an altogether more solemn sense of sacredness and inclu-
siveness of human beings as part of the Earth system (Mackey 2004). By invoking the 
imagery of a caring mother Earth, or nurturing nature, the WCN centres on an altogether 
more ecologically inclined ontology,4 which corresponds with the Earth Charter’s designa-
tion of “earth as our home”.5 If we destroy it, we have nowhere else to go. Had the Global 
Pact encapsulated such a notion already in its name, it might have gone a long way in 
signalling its intention to pursue an alternative, more radical paradigm of Earth system 
care and protection of this system’s integrity. It would also have been a better fit for emerg-
ing high-level global political and diplomatic trends, such as the recent UNGA resolution 
promoting “life in harmony with nature” (UNGA 2009), that are moving slowly but evi-
dently towards another paradigm of alternative ecocentric framings of Earth system care 
and responsibility.
Had the Global Pact instead been named, for example, as the Global Pact for Earth Sys-
tem Integrity, or simply “Global Pact for the Earth”, it could have foregrounded far more 
explicitly and deliberately, if still admittedly only symbolically, a scientifically informed 
yet ethically driven approach to resolving the current socio-ecological regulatory problem-
atique. It could also have signified that it is based on an ecological ontology that is more 
inclusive of human and non-human concerns. Other scholars have proposed the develop-
ment of a “safe operating space treaty” or a “framework convention on planetary bounda-
ries” that more fully responds to Earth system limits and that is based on the scientifically 
informed planetary boundaries theory and the need to safeguard Earth system integrity 
(Magalhães et al 2016; Fernández and Malwé 2018). Fanciful perhaps, but it has the ben-
efit of not being framed in language that, while useful in the first modern epoch of environ-
mental law in the 1970s, has been overtaken by alternative paradigms as we seek to better 
4 Preamble: “Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord 
other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action”.
5 The Preamble to the Earth Charter also says human beings have a responsibility to protect their home; a 
responsibility which is “a common concern of all peoples”.
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understand the highly complex Earth system. The Global Pact thus runs the risk—even in 
its name—of creating a dissonance between what it actually offers and that which is cur-
rently required at a scientific, diplomatic and political level. In these key respects, it is no 
more progressive than the Stockholm or the Rio Declarations. And if it is not progressive, 
as a legally binding text for future generations, does it thereby not run the risk of being 
inalienably regressive?
2.4  A “Jack of all trades, master of none”?
Going forward, if it is taken to completion, the negotiators will have to be very clear about 
the Pact’s ultimate form and purpose. In its present form, it (perhaps too) ambitiously seeks 
to tick a whole range of boxes ranging from serving as a generic binding instrument that sig-
nificantly raises the normative status of many principles of IEL; second, (not altogether unre-
latedly but nevertheless distinctly and additionally) serving as a global umbrella instrument 
integrating, consolidating and unifying the many principles of IEL that lie scattered across 
the global normative scene; and third, serving as the first (if inchoate) global environmental 
human rights instrument. After all, if it is intended to be a global environmental rights instru-
ment, it would do well to consider and incorporate much more expansively the work of the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment (UN Human Rights Coun-
cil 2018), and indeed the Human Rights Council in this area, in its attempt to raise global 
environmental protection to the international “constitutional” level (Kotzé 2016). The then 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox, for example, has 
developed 16 Framework Principles (UN Human Rights Council 2018) which, if the Global 
Pact is to become the principal instrument on environmental rights, it should collectively and 
comprehensively elaborate the substantive and procedural aspects of the right to a healthy 
environment that are contained in these Framework Principles. As we point out below in 
greater detail, the Pact would also have to provide far more deliberately and extensively the 
entire panoply of human rights-related provisions, institutions, mechanisms and protective 
procedures usually found in human rights instruments, including among others those regulat-
ing the relationship with other human rights and human rights instruments, compliance and 
enforcement mechanisms and procedures, jurisdictional application and conflict resolution 
procedures. In short, it would have to become a global human rights instrument. On the other 
hand, if it aims to be a generic (i.e. summary in content) treaty on environmental matters, it 
will equally have to be very clear on its relationship with other current binding instruments of 
IEL, and it will have to provide clauses for resolution in case of normative collision between 
its provisions and those of another instrument. See, for example, the important norm-recon-
ciliation provision in the Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992.6
Related to the issue of clarifying its nature is the diverse and often confusing focus of 
its regulatory provisions. As Biniaz points out, some of the Pact’s provisions have an inter-
state application (for example, the preventive principle in draft article 5), while others are 
seemingly directed to domestic situations (for example, the right to access to information in 
draft article 9),7 and yet others are left open-ended (for example, the duty of care principle 
6 Art 22: “(1) The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any Con-
tracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights 
and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity. (2) Contracting Parties shall 
implement this Convention with respect to the marine environment consistent”.
7 See specifically Aarhus Convention (Article 3.7) and European Parliament (2018: para. 22).
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in draft article 2) (Biniaz 2017: 3). In addition, while states are most usually the main refer-
ent or subject of IEL, the Pact seeks to place some duties on individuals, such as its duty of 
care principle, which says “[E]very State or international institution, every person, natural 
or legal, public or private, has the duty to take care of the environment” (emphasis added). 
The discrepancy between the moral reach of the Pact’s provisions and its normative effects 
is not altogether novel (see, among others, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations), and yet 
within the confines of a legally binding treaty—in contrast to soft law declarations—it is 
singularly more problematic.
This is not to say that the extension of the Pact to a whole range of state and non-state 
actors in diverse geographical and regulatory settings is not to be welcomed. In many 
respects, such an extension would be supported, as the extension of liabilities and obli-
gations to non-state parties would better reflect the role such actors play in global envi-
ronmental degradation and their accompanying responsibilities. But as draft article 14—as 
quoted above in part 2(1)—makes clear, the Pact does not ultimately depart from its tradi-
tional intergovernmental strictures, and thus, one must ask what value there is in including 
such provisions. Does it do so in the aspiration that States will domestically incorporate 
them,8 for purely symbolical reasons, or as recognition of the evolving nature of environ-
mental principles? But this merely takes us back to the earlier question: what is the actual 
purpose of the Pact? It is that question which must remain at the forefront of the debate, 
as we now turn to consider the content of the Pact, beginning first with its preambular 
provisions.
3  Operational level potential
One of the major objectives of the Global Pact is to “enshrine the founding principles of 
environmental law” (Le Club de Juristes 2017a: 7). To this end, it seeks to consolidate 
all existing principles in one instrument. That the Pact is less focused on legal innovation 
than on normative integration and the consolidation of existing principles is clearly evident 
from Justice Fabius’ introductory explanation accompanying the Pact that: “[M]ost of the 
principles contained in this text have already been agreed on in international environmental 
law” (Le Club de Juristes 2017a: 3). It is therefore by its own admission and that of its pro-
ponents mostly a restatement of the law, although as we note below the Pact does provide 
for a few novel provisions that are not yet widely contained in other IEL instruments, and 
even to a lesser extent, principles that already exist but which have been revised and conse-
quently improved. We provide a summary below of its content, with the view to critiquing 
its operational potential.
3.1  Preambular promises
The Pact commences encouragingly enough in its preamble by calling for “ambitious” con-
certed global actions. With a nod to the Pact’s forebears, it reasserts the Stockholm and 
8 Lord Carnwath, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, opines “[I]t is indeed at national 
level, and in the national courts, that the Pact, like the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, may well have 
its main impact … the Pact could provide a strong and principled framework for the interpretation and 
development of … national laws within a shared global vision of the environmental rule of law” (Carnwath 
2018).
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Rio Declarations (but surprisingly enough and for no apparent reason, not the Johannes-
burg Declaration on Sustainable Development of 2002, Rio + 20’s The Future We Want, or 
Agenda 21). More innovatively and encouragingly, however, unlike almost any other global 
environmental instrument produced since the 1980s, the Global Pact explicitly reaffirms 
the provisions of the WCN, which is a “historic landmark in the evolution of global eth-
ics” (Mackey 2004: 85) and still the only ecocentrically inclined global instrument that has 
been endorsed by the UNGA. The Charter is “[A] first attempt to free nature from human 
arbitrariness” and “to move beyond the anthropocentric and narrowly egocentric perspec-
tive of the modern world which sees nature to be there only for humans” (Moltmann 1991: 
121). With its reference to the WCN, the preamble of the Pact raises expectations regarding 
the ontology of its subsequent substantive provisions, their ethical orientation and their 
possible rejection of neoliberal anthropocentrism in favour of an altogether stronger sense 
of ecological obligation and a high level of protection, on par with the provisions of the 
WCN. Unfortunately, this is an expectation that it does not meet, as we shall show below.
In sharp contrast to its acknowledgement of the WCN, the preamble then also reaf-
firms obligations in terms of the human development-oriented anthropocentric Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (for a recent comprehensive overview, see French and Kotzé 
2018), thereby underlining the enduring centrality of sustainable human development as a 
focal point of the Pact’s orientation (Kotzé 2018). And in true paradoxical form, the Global 
Pact is a mix of weak and strong sustainable development that, in trite anthropocentric 
terms, “allows each generation to satisfy its needs without compromising the capability 
of future generation [sic] to meet theirs, while respecting [in stronger ecocentric terms] 
the balance and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem”. But with its explicit reference to the 
SDGs, the Pact remains aligned with the anthropocentric three-pillared approach to sus-
tainable development, an approach which continues to be a convenient palliative (Rich-
ardson 2011), that legitimises at a high normative and political level the type of unbridled 
development that pushes ecological interests to the periphery of regulatory concerns, while 
prioritising social and economic development at the expense of both global Earth system 
integrity and of meaningful international solidarity between peoples.
The Pact highlights the “urgency to tackle climate change” and “unprecedented biodi-
versity loss”, as well as the need to ensure that “ecosystems are resilient”, but seemingly 
only so that ecosystems can “continue to provide essential services, thereby preserving the 
diversity of life on Earth, and contribute to human well-being and the eradication of pov-
erty” (emphasis added). The important role of women in sustainable development is recog-
nised, as are the rights and knowledge of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, 
children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations, reflecting some of 
the provisions—if not always the precise language—of the Rio Declaration. The need to 
“respect, promote and consider … obligations on human rights” is explicitly stated, but it 
is particularly striking that states’ human rights obligations are only confined to the “need 
to respect, promote and consider” and not the more generally accepted (and arguably more 
far-reaching) duties to respect, protect and fulfil their human rights obligations.9
Recognising the indispensable role of non-state actors in global environmental govern-
ance, the preamble then highlights the “vital role” of civil society, economic actors, cit-
ies, regions and other subnational authorities in environmental protection, while stressing 
the “fundamental importance of science and education for sustainable development”. It 
9 See, among others, the language used in the three instruments comprising the International Bill of Rights, 
and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Human Rights Council 2011).
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concludes by recognising the need for action to be guided by inter-generational and intra-
generational equity (the latter of which is strangely omitted later from its operative provi-
sions, as is any notion of international solidarity), and more rhetorically, an idealistic affir-
mation of the “need to adopt a common position and principles that will inspire and guide 
the efforts of all to protect and preserve the environment”. Again, if this is to be a legally 
binding treaty, what is the legal status of “inspire and guide”? It may be a valid recogni-
tion that jurisprudentially as principles they are more open-textured than rules (Beyerlin 
2007: 425), but the addition of “the efforts of all” would seem to open up the possibility 
of a more worrying conclusion: that the ambivalence of what the Pact is and to whom it is 
addressed (as discussed above) has permeated the text itself. Neither fish nor fowl—will 
the Pact survive the scrutiny that comes with intergovernmental analysis?
In sum, the preamble contains several contradictions, and aside from its recognition of 
the WCN and the concept of ecosystem integrity, there is very little in the Pact’s preambu-
lar provisions specifically providing for non-human life protection, justice and integrity, or 
principles recognising Earth system limits and integrity. The preamble also largely ignores 
the issue of distributional inequality that is the bedrock of much environmental destruction, 
as well as the necessity of enhanced global cooperation in the form of international solidar-
ity in which to begin to tackle global environmental destruction. Currently, the preamble 
offers almost nothing new, innovative or different from that which has already occurred in 
all global environmental declarations since 1972.
3.2  A turn to rights?
Immediately following its preamble is the human right to an ecologically sound environ-
ment, which says: “[E]very person has the right to live in an ecologically sound environ-
ment adequate for their health, well-being, dignity, culture and fulfilment” (draft article 
1). Its inclusion at the very start of the Pact’s substantive provisions is important, as it 
confirms the significant weight attributed to it, the fact that this would be the first global 
treaty to recognise such a right, and even its centrality as a potential Grundnorm of the 
Pact itself and possibly of global environmental law and governance [a fact also recog-
nised by the former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment in 
2018 (Knox 2018)]. The right’s formulation in the Pact corresponds with the general for-
mulations of a human right to a healthy environment found in many domestic constitutions 
and in regional human rights instruments (O’Gorman 2017; Boyd 2011). The Pact’s draft 
environmental right provision aims to promote an ecologically sound environment for the 
benefit of human development, and not for the sake of nature or for preserving the integrity 
of the Earth system. It is a far cry from the emerging non-anthropocentric rights of nature 
provisions and jurisprudence aimed at safeguarding ecological integrity that are now found 
in several countries such as in Bolivia, Ecuador, Columbia, New Zealand and some states 
in the USA (Kotzé and Calzadilla 2017; Calzadilla and Kotzé 2018).
But while the formulation of its environmental right provision is not particularly innova-
tive or potentially far-reaching, the simple fact of its inclusion is nevertheless commend-
able. Currently, apart from the Stockholm Declaration, which implicitly hints at the exist-
ence of a right to a healthy environment (Principle 1), no other global environmental or 
human rights instrument, hard or soft, provides for such a right. The Pact thus responds to 
the former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox’s rec-
ommendation in his final report, namely, that the Human Rights Council must “consider 
supporting the recognition of the right in a global instrument” (UN Human Rights Council 
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2018: para. 14), though, as noted above, the mere inclusion of the right without further pro-
vision would be an inchoate insertion of a human rights approach. Nevertheless, the Pact 
could play a major part in such an endeavour, the possibility of which is also recognised by 
its proponents themselves, who have an ambitious anticipation that the Pact will represent 
the “third generation of [environmental] rights” (World Commission on Environmental 
Law 2017), and be “to the Rio Declaration [of 1992] what the 1966 International Cov-
enants [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] are to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” (Le Club de Juristes 2017a: 32).
But if it does retain (and hopefully deepen) its environmental right provision, because 
the Pact’s nature and designation will impact on both its normative status and its focus, it 
will have to be clear about whether it is foremost a globally binding human rights instru-
ment with associated (secondary) IEL principles that are necessary to respect, protect 
and fulfil the environmental right (thereby becoming part of the panoply of the arguably 
higher-order International Bill of Rights) or whether it is a generic global environmen-
tal agreement, rather similar to a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA), which just 
happens also to contain a substantive environmental right provision that operates alongside 
various other provisions. As we have noted above, this question is stylistic on one level, but 
on another it is a matter of substance, and importantly of treaty interpretation. The present 
iteration suggests that the Pact as a whole can best be explained as being more akin to the 
latter, which correspondingly suggests that the provision will less likely be able to give 
meaningful effect to the right to live in an ecologically sound environment as the newest 
legally entrenched global human right. Of course, the mere inclusion of such a right is not 
to be rejected, for this reason, but its longer-term impact will undoubtedly be influenced by 
the context (and the other content) in which it occurs.10
Complementing the substantive right to a healthy environment, draft articles 9–11 
provide for rights-based aspects of environmental democracy by setting out procedural 
environment-related human rights including the rights to access to information, public par-
ticipation, and access to environmental justice. Although the rights are presently opera-
tive predominantly only in Europe through the Aarhus Convention on Access to Informa-
tion, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters of 1998 (Aarhus 
Convention), the provisions of this convention are detailed and backed by a complex 
institutional machinery. Thus, it already comprehensively, and some would say success-
fully covers, protects and enforces these aspects (Hey 2015). A similar treaty—the Escazú 
Agreement on Access to Information, Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú Agreement)—has opened for signature in 
September 2018 for Latin America and the Caribbean.11 Unlike both treaties, however, the 
Global Pact does not provide for a compliance procedure to address complaints of rights 
11 Adopted under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) at Escazú/Costa Rica on 4 March 2018, and opened for signature at the UN Secretariat in New 
York on 27 September 2018. The Escazú Agreement on Access to Information, Participation and Justice in 
Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean is far from being a direct copy of the Aarhus 
Agreement, and there are some important additions including the principles of non-regression and of pro-
gressive realisation (art 3) and an obligation to protect human rights defenders in environmental matters (art 
9).
10 Art 31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose”.
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infringements. In the case of the Aarhus Convention, its compliance mechanism is a unique 
innovation in IEL which allows members of the public to communicate grievances about 
a Party’s compliance directly to a board of independent experts, which can then make rec-
ommendations to the Meeting of the Parties (Ebbesson et al 2014). Of course, the majority 
of states remain outside these regimes and thus not subject to anything other than the aspi-
rational terms of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, which both the Aarhus Convention 
and Escazú Agreement more fully give effect to. Thus while it might be argued that the 
procedural rights set out in the Pact only provide general obligations, they would neverthe-
less be a significant development for much of the international community. Nevertheless, 
it remains the case that the lack of detail in the Pact would leave the implementation of 
these rights solely to the discretion of states, with limited prescription applying on how to 
enact or to ensure compliance. In this sense, simply measured against what has shown to 
already exist in IEL—now in both the Global North and the Global South—the procedural 
environmental rights enunciated in the Pact are a clear regression and they can be nothing 
but hortatory in effect.
3.3  Duty of care
The Pact provides in draft article 2 for a broadly formulated duty of care, which might 
rightly be seen as a natural corollary to the right to an ecologically sound environment 
(Payne 2018): “[E]very State or international institution, every person, natural or legal, 
public or private, has the duty to take care of the environment. To this end, everyone con-
tributes at their own levels to the conservation, protection and restoration of the integrity 
of the Earth’s ecosystem” (draft article 2). Whether or not such a broad duty of care across 
such a diverse range of actors could be said strictly to be an existing principle of IEL, this 
is a comprehensive formulation establishing a thoroughgoing and all-embracing duty of 
care that is potentially applicable to a wide range of state and non-state entities. Though not 
a novel provision—something similar exists in the Stockholm Declaration12—we would 
suggest it is nevertheless innovative, particularly if taken literally to expand the application 
of the Pact horizontally to non-state entities, such as transnational corporations. To date, 
corporations still do not incur any meaningful human rights obligations; Ruggie’s Protect, 
Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights (Ruggie 2008), though 
progressive in many respects, relies on traditional jurisdictional boundaries between inter-
national and domestic law.
Of course, as noted above, one must note the technique often used in soft law to include 
moral injunction opposable to all, and more precise rule opposable only to some (namely 
states). But, of course, the Pact is not meant to be soft law. And thus, how is such a provi-
sion meant to be understood? Previous attempts to impose direct legally binding interna-
tional rules on transnational corporations13 met with derision and scorn. The same would 
arguably be true here. If, on the other hand, there was no intention to impose such an 
12 Which provides in its Preamble: “[T]o achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of 
responsibility by citizens and communities and by enterprises and institutions at every level, all sharing 
equitably in common efforts. Individuals in all walks of life as well as organizations in many fields, by their 
values and the sum of their actions, will shape the world environment of the future”.
13 UN Economic and Social Council (2003: para. 1): “Within their respective spheres of activity and influ-
ence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the 
fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as 
national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups”.
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obligation, what notion of “duty” as a legal concept is this, within a binding treaty? Unless 
the Pact challenges the systemic nature of intergovernmental relations, such horizontal 
application will be limited to that implemented in domestic law. In its present draft form, 
the Pact does not challenge the traditional norms of international personality.
3.4  Sustainable development and equity
Draft article 3 reaffirms the centrality of, and critical need to pursue, “sustainable devel-
opment”, but unlike the duty of care principle discussed above, this provision curiously 
seems to be aimed at state parties only, and not also at non-state parties. This is a criti-
cal oversight, since non-state actors such as transnational corporations are often those that 
most negatively impact on Earth system integrity, whereas the objective to achieve sustain-
able development is not, and has never been, an exclusive public governance function, as 
the now firmly established and widely practised private sector-focused European Union 
Eco-management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and ISO 14001 environmental management 
standards, among others, suggest.
Moreover, though politically not an unsurprising inclusion, the Pact’s invocation of 
“sustainable development” perpetuates the contested—though widely held—myth that it is 
possible to achieve ongoing, and even to expand, economic human growth within a limited 
Earth system. Like associated oxymorons such as “environmental resources”, “ecosystem 
services” and “green economy”, it does not offer a radically different alternative for steer-
ing human actions on a path of greater Earth system integrity and care (Redclift 2005). 
Ultimately, the Pact’s endorsement of sustainable development as a critical objective for 
states to achieve, ensures that it is no different from any other global environmental decla-
ration to date in terms of its long-term objective and underlying ethos.
Sustainable development is an easy phrase to repeat but much more difficult to convert 
into a legal obligation.14 Thus, from a legal perspective the language the Pact uses, also, is 
problematic. As with many of the draft articles, there seems to have been little attempt to 
integrate recent jurisprudence, especially of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), into 
the wording of the draft article. Draft article 3, for instance, would have done well to con-
sider the ICJ’s judgement in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (ICJ Reports (2010) 14), 
where the court sought to develop sustainable development from being a platitude (as it 
had used it in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) ICJ Reports (1997) 7),15 
and begin to address its normative implications.16 Another attempt was, for instance, also 
previously made by the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on International 
Law on Sustainable Development.17 It is still at a level of abstraction, but one can begin to 
14 Draft article 3 would seem to suggest two principal legal techniques to achieve sustainable development: 
(i) integration (“Parties shall integrate the requirements of environmental protection into the planning and 
implementation of their policies and national and international activities”), and (ii) the “promotion of public 
support policies, patterns of production and consumption”.
15 ICJ Reports (1997) 7, 78: “This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environ-
ment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development”.
16 For instance, ICJ Reports (2010) 14, 75: “[the] interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable uti-
lization of a shared resource and the balance between economic development and environmental protection 
that is the essence of sustainable development”.
17 See, for instance, the International Law Association (2012) Sofia Guiding Statements, including Guiding 
Statement (1): “Recourse to the concept of ‘sustainable development’ in international case law may, over-
time, reflect a maturing of the concept into a principle of international law, despite a continued and genuine 
reluctance to formalise a distinctive legal status”; and Guiding Statement (2): “Treaties and rules of custom-
ary international law should be interpreted in the light of principles of sustainable development; interpreta-
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identify key features. Drafting difficulties to one side, the Global Pact as presently worded 
would seem to lack the detail—however inchoate—necessary to reflect the development of 
the concept over the last 25 years.
Draft article 4 then sets out the duty to observe and ensure inter-generational equity, 
which has traditionally always been related to the issue of achieving sustainable devel-
opment. As referenced above, it is unclear why the drafters of the Pact chose to ignore 
the critical issue of intra-generational equity at a time when there are clear inequalities 
between people on Earth; inequalities that are vividly exemplified through the North–South 
divide (Gonzales 2017). Related to the decision not to include a rights of nature provi-
sion in the Pact, they also ignored the issue of intra-species equity, which is surprising 
considering that many pervasive climate and broader environmental injustices abound not 
only between human beings of this and the next generation, but also between human and 
non-human entities of this and the next generation. It is also disconcerting, as Raith notes, 
that other equity-related principles such as the equitable use of shared or common natural 
resources, and common responsibility for collective interests and goods including com-
mon areas, common heritage and common concern, have not been included (Raith 2018: 
14). The Pact’s view of equity is decidedly narrow and exclusionary, and despite its grand 
claims, it is far from being comprehensive in any meaningful sense. In fact, in this regard 
the Pact could be considered a clear regression from the well-established IEL principles of 
inter- and intra-generational equity.
3.5  More of the same
Draft articles 5–8 in broad terms repeat, without much effort to revise or “update” them, 
traditional IEL principles that one also finds in numerous soft law instruments and MEAs, 
including the principles of prevention (with the corresponding and well-established obliga-
tion to undertake an environmental impact assessment),18 precaution, the remediation of 
environmental damages, as well as state duties to inform one another and to cooperate, and 
the polluter pays principle. They seem simply to have been “copied and pasted”, while no 
apparent thought was given to reframing them in terms of emerging case law, realities or 
progressive moves forward. They are neither innovative nor sufficiently radical to represent 
anything markedly different from what IEL already offers.
There are also numerous omissions both of principles themselves and of nuances within 
those listed. Four instances are given as sufficient examples of the obvious omissions in the 
text. First, the Pact fails to include, for instance, principle 23 of the Rio Declaration: “The 
environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination and occupation 
shall be protected”. A controversial provision yes,19 but one that is still hugely relevant. 
18 Though the Pact fails to reference explicitly, in the case of potential transboundary harm, the recognition 
of the now customary nature of the obligation to undertake an environmental impact assessment (see Pulp 
Mills ICJ Reports (2010) 14, 83).
19 See, for instance, UNGA (2017: para. 6): “Israel, the occupying Power, to bring a halt to all actions, 
including those perpetrated by Israeli settlers, harming the environment, including the dumping of all kinds 
of waste materials, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory … which gravely threaten their natural resources, 
namely water and land resources, and which pose an environmental, sanitation and health threat to the civil-
ian populations”.
tions which might seem to undermine the goal of sustainable development should only take precedence 
where to do otherwise would undermine fundamental aspects of the global legal order, infringe the express 
wording of a treaty or breach a rule of jus cogens”.
Footnote 17 (continued)
828 L. J. Kotzé, D. French 
1 3
Second, in a more nuanced way, the Pact ignores the significant case-law developments on 
the issue of due diligence,20 as a way of holding States to account and as the measure by 
which States are held to account for the actions of private actors under their jurisdiction 
and control.21 There are arguments, of course, as to how far the case-law developments 
related to due diligence can be generalised outside their particular dispute matrix (Inter-
national Law Association 2014, 2016), but to ignore such developments altogether seems 
short-sighted and regressive. Third, there is no engagement with the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC) work on the prevention of transboundary harm (UN 2007: 148–170), 
which is particularly striking as the ICJ has had occasion to consider the issue in signifi-
cant detail (Costa Rica v Nicaragua and Nicaragua v Costa Rica ICJ Reports (2015) 665). 
Instead, the language of the draft articles looks cursory and lacking in depth. For instance, 
draft article 5 instead of stating “The necessary measures shall be taken to prevent environ-
mental harm” might have borrowed from Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, mutatis mutan-
dis, to strengthen the obligation: “A State is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal 
in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdic-
tion, causing significant damage to the environment of another State” (ICJ Reports (2010) 
14, 56) (emphasis added).
Fourth, the provision on precaution is notably weak and lacks both detail and substance. 
Whereas draft article 6 is unduly summary in form,22 recent case law has developed the 
language in some important respects. The Seabed Dispute Chamber’s 2011 Advisory Opin-
ion, for instance, has highlighted an important and evolving dynamism to precaution.23 
This is also the case with the draft provision on the remediation of environmental dam-
age.24 If this is where nearly 30 years of legal and political debate has taken us, or more 
20 See, for instance, Pulp Mills ICJ Reports (2010) 14, 79: “obligation to act with due diligence in respect 
of all activities which take place under the jurisdiction and control of each party. It is an obligation which 
entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their 
enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as 
the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights of the other party”.
21 Responsibilities and obligations of states sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the 
area, International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) Reports (2011) 10, 60: “Under international 
law, the acts of private entities are not directly attributable to States except where the entity in question 
is empowered to act as a State organ…or where its conduct is acknowledged and adopted by a State as its 
own”.
22 “Where there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing the adoption of effective and proportionate measures to prevent environmental 
degradation”.
23 Responsibilities and obligations of states sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in 
the Area ITLOS Reports (2011) 10, 46: “the precautionary approach is also an integral part of the general 
obligation of due diligence…This obligation applies in situations where scientific evidence concerning the 
scope and potential negative impact of the activity in question is insufficient but where there are plausible 
indications of potential risks”. It is also worth noting what the Chamber thus says about due diligence: 
““due diligence” is a variable concept. It may change over time as measures considered sufficiently diligent 
at a certain moment may become not diligent enough in light, for instance, of new scientific or technologi-
cal knowledge. It may also change in relation to the risks involved in the activity” (ITLOS Reports (2011) 
10, 43).
24 “The necessary measures shall be taken to ensure an adequate remediation of environmental damages”. 
Cf. Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) Compensation 
owed by the Republic of Nicaragua to the Republic of Costa Rica Judgment of 2 February 2018. Admittedly 
this is a recent case and it was not decided when the Draft Pact was written, but it should be taken into con-
sideration during future drafting processes.
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accurately as far as the drafters felt they could go, then this is a damning indictment of IEL 
indeed. In all cases, the operational aspect of the Pact seems to have been subjugated to the 
perceived advantage of the mere inclusion of such principles in the text, seemingly merely 
for inclusion’s sake. But is this sufficient?
For those principles, however phrased, which are included in the Pact, other questions 
arise, notably as to what the relationship may be between these principles in the Pact and 
the instruments and customary rules where they otherwise arise. Biniaz correctly notes 
that principles such as polluter pays, prevention, precaution and environmental assess-
ment appear within a very specific context in numerous different MEAs and other soft law 
instruments, and they have been incorporated in each of these instruments for a specific 
reason. The open-ended generic nature within which they have been framed in the Pact 
would make it difficult to establish which instrument’s principle would prevail if they were 
ever to come into conflict. More fundamentally, one might question their inclusion in the 
first place, since they have had limited demonstrable success in improving global environ-
mental quality, either on their own, or as part of other MEAs. The inclusion of emerging 
and more radical principles such as in dubio pro natura, the need to protect Earth system 
integrity, intra-species justice and equity, extending legal subjectivity to non-human enti-
ties, and others, could have gone a long way towards raising this bar, a matter which we 
return to below.
3.6  Environmental education and technological innovation
Draft article 12 sets out parties’ commitment to promoting environmental education, 
a “softer” but nevertheless critically important obligation that should in theory promote 
efforts to advance societal understanding and responses to environmental degradation. 
Somewhat relatedly, draft article 13 implores parties to promote “the improvement of sci-
entific knowledge of ecosystems and the impact of human activities”. It further asks of 
parties to cooperate through the exchange of scientific and technological knowledge “by 
enhancing the development, adaptation, dissemination and transfer of technologies respect-
ful of the environment, including innovative technologies”. Considering that technological 
innovation will probably play a key role in adaptation, also with a view to becoming more 
resilient in the face of an increasingly erratic Earth system, this is a potentially useful pro-
vision relevant to the concerted pursuit of alternatives for survival in the Anthropocene 
(Haff 2014).
However, the obligations that state and non-state actors derive from this provision are 
non-peremptory, and parties are only encouraged to strive to “promote, to the best of their 
ability” the improvement of scientific knowledge and innovation. Although it encourages 
“technologies respectful of the environment”, the provision is also silent on prohibiting 
the effects of harmful technologies, such as nuclear activities, that disrupt Earth system 
equilibrium. In so doing, the Pact only embraces the benefits of technological innovations 
and does not address the substantial potential harms that could be caused by environmen-
tal technologies. Also, the obligation to cooperate and to develop technologies does not 
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explicitly include the giving of assistance to those who need it most, namely developing 
and least developed countries.
The critical importance of indigenous knowledge systems in relation to the Earth sys-
tem is also not recognised at all. Considering that indigenous knowledge plays a prominent 
role in radically reshaping environmental, human rights and other norms (for example, the 
indigenous notions of Pachamama and Vivir Bien that are foundational to Ecuadorian and 
Bolivian rights of nature laws), this is a potentially serious sidelining of non-Western views 
that works further to exclude already marginalised and peripheral indigenous worldviews 
in an increasingly neoliberal, industrialised, “modernised” world and its hegemonic system 
of public international law. As a Global Pact, critical third world scholars would remind us 
to ask whose globe we are referring to (Chimni 2006).
3.7  Non‑state actors and global environmental governance
Draft article 14 innovatively extends the relevance, if not the application, of the Pact 
beyond the usual state actors by providing that states “shall take the necessary measures 
to encourage the implementation of this Pact by non-State actors and subnational entities, 
including civil society, economic actors, cities and regions taking into account their vital 
role in the protection of the environment” (own emphasis). This provision is broadly simi-
lar to the non-state actor application of the duty of care provided in article 2, but it is a far 
weaker formulation in that encouragement does not amount to enforcement, but recognises 
the limitations of traditional public international law. Whether this renders the provision 
toothless is a matter of political ambition and implementation, but we find it problematic 
nevertheless considering that considerable Earth system impacts are occasioned by non-
state actors. Moreover, as we have pointed out above, no explicit liability is set out for 
Earth system harm caused by non-state actors such as transnational corporations.
3.8  Effective environmental laws
Apparently mimicking principle 11 of the Rio Declaration which provides that “[S]tates 
shall enact effective environmental legislation”, draft article 15 of the Pact says parties 
“have the duty to adopt effective environmental laws, and to ensure their effective and fair 
implementation and enforcement”. There is no indication in the text of the Pact itself of 
what the term “effective” entails, but it could possibly relate to normative effectiveness, i.e. 
adherence to specified minimum standards that should arguably also be informed by proper 
science and that should improve environmental quality or avoid its deterioration. A similar 
technique can be found in the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
of 1993, the environmental side agreement of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
where the states parties are encumbered “with the aim of achieving high levels of environ-
mental protection and compliance with its environmental laws and regulations, each Party 
shall effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations through appropriate gov-
ernmental action” (Article 5). Of course, the latter provision does not stand alone but exists 
within an institutionalised and procedural framework of consultation and dispute resolution 
which, as noted below, is largely absent from the Global Pact.
One would also have expected the inclusion of a generic minimum threshold such as 
Earth system integrity, which provides the aspirational (albeit abstract) minimum that envi-
ronmental law must achieve. Thus, if an environmental law norm is not sufficient in either 
preventing the decay of Earth system integrity; and/or maintaining Earth system integrity; 
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and/or enhancing Earth system integrity, it would be ineffective. Another possibility would 
be to incorporate the planetary boundaries as a generic threshold into the Pact. These 
boundaries are based on “a sound scientific knowledge base that has been developed over 
the past several decades” (Kim and Bosselmann 2013: 289), and they determine a safe 
operating space for humanity within a compromised Earth system while offering a concrete 
vision of the limitations of the planet (expressed as boundaries) to sustain all life in the 
wake of increasing anthropogenic pressures (Rockström et al 2009). An incorporation of 
the planetary boundaries as thresholds would accommodate the view that:
… effective environmental legislation must at a minimum act as legal boundaries that 
prevent human activities from reaching and breaching planetary boundaries, defined 
as the safe space for mankind to operate within… In other words, legal boundaries 
must translate the physical reality of a finite world into law and thereby delimit 
acceptable levels of human activity. (Chapron et al. 2017: 1)
Related to the provision on effective environmental laws is draft article 17, which sets out 
the principle of non-regression, and which determines that “[P]arties and their sub-national 
entities [must] refrain from allowing activities or adopting norms that have the effect of 
reducing the global level of environmental protection guaranteed by current law”. While 
it is a potentially impactful and useful provision, and is largely novel in IEL up to now,25 
we believe the non-regression principle could have been taken further, to have also pro-
vided for the duty to improve the level of environmental protection offered by current laws. 
Maintaining the current level of protection, or the status quo, means we would in effect be 
maintaining the legal regime that contributed to the conditions that caused the Anthropo-
cene in the first place, which would be an untenable situation for obvious reasons. Even the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change of 2015, which is far from perfect, has done much to 
introduce the idea of ongoing normative progression within IEL: “[E]ach Party’s successive 
nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then cur-
rent nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition” (Article 
4.3). It is a pity that this reasonably new approach has not also been incorporated in the Pact.
3.9  Resilience
Similarly, the Paris Agreement sets out in several provisions the objective to increase the 
resilience of people and of ecosystems in the context of climate change (Articles 2, 7, 8 
and 10). Draft article 16 of the Global Pact places a more generic (i.e. non-climate change 
specific) obligation on states to increase the resilience of people and ecosystems: “[P]arties 
shall take necessary measures to maintain and restore the diversity and capacity of ecosys-
tems and human communities to withstand environmental disruptions and degradation and 
to recover and adapt”. While it is therefore not a novel provision, it is entirely appropri-
ate, considering that concerns around safeguarding and improving resilience will become 
ever more present and critical in the Anthropocene (Grove and Chandler 2017). We would 
caution, however, against an overt reliance on resilience as a stand-alone concept with-
out reference to its politico-legal context.26 In particular, we would suggest—as a matter 
25 See, however, the previous reference to art. 3 of the 2018 Escazú Agreement on Access to Information, 
Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean.
26 Cosens (2013: 3): “The key difference between social and ecological systems is that the actors in the 
social system have the ability to exercise free will and conscious thought. Thus, the social system may 
choose whether or not to foster resilience in the ecological system” (emphasis added).
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of terminology—that it be amended to make it explicit that it is not only about human 
resilience, but also about the resilience of non-human life, as well as Earth system resil-
ience. While the current draft provision does not do so, any revision must acknowledge 
that vulnerable people mostly living in the Global South, especially in low-lying island 
states, are the least resilient to Earth system changes and that they require special attention 
and assistance. Otherwise, resilience risks becoming a narrow, technical and anthropocen-
tric objective, focusing on ex post facto actions and not demanding systematic preventa-
tive measures, while at once ignoring critical issues of global equity, justice, solidarity and 
cooperation between countries.
3.10  Miscellaneous
The remainder of the Pact deals, often in somewhat trite terms, with numerous substantive 
and procedural issues one also finds in other global environmental agreements, namely: 
global cooperation, armed conflict, the principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities, monitoring and implementation (substantive issues); and secretarial arrangements, 
signature and ratification, entry into force, denunciation and depository (procedural issues). 
We focus below on the substantive issues.
Starting with draft article 18, the Pact explicitly highlights the importance of global 
cooperation to facilitate its implementation with a specific view to conserving, protecting 
and even restoring the integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem and community of life. Its refer-
ence to “ecosystem integrity” is encouraging, as is its inclusion of the term “community 
of life”, which, being non-specific, might be broad enough to embrace non-human life as 
well. And yet cooperation is both complex and imperative in IEL. The limited conceptuali-
sation of cooperation in draft article 18 does not do justice to the range of such obligations 
in the current law, never mind stretching it as de lege ferenda. In which case, if this is to be 
the new “go to” document, what does that say about the Pact’s true level of ambition?
According to draft article 19, states must take, pursuant to their numerous other relevant 
obligations under international law, “all feasible measures to protect the environment in 
relation to armed conflicts”. This is a commendable provision considering that immense 
environmental damage is associated with armed conflict (as the past and ongoing wars in 
the Middle East aptly suggest). But as a statement on the present law, this provision is 
rather scant and, like draft article 18, fails to reflect adequately current law, and thus raises 
questions as regards more recent developments scattered across the international humani-
tarian, criminal and environmental law plane.27 What draft article 19 also regrettably 
fails to do is to provide for addressing armed conflicts that could emanate from (shared) 
resource use, environment-related migration and climate change, among many other fac-
tors. This is a crucially growing concern that remains unresolved (Klare 2002), with a win-
dow of opportunity now opening through its inclusion in the Pact for its regulation.
As has already been noted, in some of its provisions the Pact fails to specifically rec-
ognise the interests of developing countries. But with a nod in the direction of the ever-
deepening North–South divide, and in much the same way as it is done elsewhere in 
27 The ILC is presently completing an important set of draft articles on the “Protection of the Environment 
in relation to Armed Conflicts”. See, previously, UNEP (2009).
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international law, the Pact does provide in generalised terms in draft Article 20 that “[T]
he special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and 
those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special attention”. It also reiterates 
verbatim the Paris Climate Agreement’s qualification that parties have common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities determined by their respective capabilities in the light of dif-
ferent national circumstances (article 2.2). This language was specific to the politics of the 
climate change regime and arguably a broader commitment to solidarity still exists within 
IEL, as evidenced by the extant principle 7 of the Rio Declaration.28 A more ambitious 
commitment that pursues global equity between states and peoples would have been a posi-
tive development, which we believe could encourage more deliberate and effective involve-
ment of the Global South in global environmental governance.
While there is no compliance mechanism to oversee the observance, protection and 
implementation of the substantive and procedural environmental human rights of the Pact, 
draft article 21 does provide for a general “compliance mechanism to facilitate implemen-
tation of, and to promote compliance with, the provisions” of the Pact. It is foreseen by 
the Pact itself that this mechanism will consist of a committee of independent experts, 
and very much like the Aarhus Compliance Mechanism, it will focus on facilitation in a 
“transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner” (draft article 21). While the jury 
is still out on whether such a soft non-punitive, consultative strategy is to be preferred in 
global environmental governance as opposed to a more punitive command-and-control sys-
tem, the provision of a compliance mechanism is commendable and should go some way 
towards promoting observance of the Pact’s provisions. We also find it surprising that the 
drafters of the Pact did not think it appropriate or necessary to provide the foundations here 
for the establishment of a global environmental court that has jurisdiction over global envi-
ronmental disputes, the creation of which could aid the peaceful settlement of global envi-
ronmental disputes under the auspices of the rule of law (Rest 1998; but see Hey 2000). We 
would suggest that the inclusion of such a judicial structure should at least be considered 
by states.
4  Conclusion
The Global Pact presents an important opportunity that could offer a radically different 
alternative for a globally binding instrument aimed at overcoming many of the failures of 
IEL, while also confronting some of the Anthropocene’s socio-ecological challenges. But 
disappointingly, and apart from some exceptions, the Pact brings little new to the table. A 
plain reading of the Pact in its present iteration suggests that it often regurgitates many, 
though not all, generally accepted principles of IEL and that it is mostly devoid of an eco-
centric ethic of socio-ecological care. As it stands, the Pact is neither nearly as radical 
as it could have been, nor as it should be, if it is to act as an ethically based higher-order 
28 “States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degra-
dation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures 
their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they com-
mand”.
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normative instrument that binds states to clear obligations that could address the socio-
ecological crisis of the Anthropocene.
In the light of its ambition, and subject to the evaluative criteria just outlined, we are 
therefore deeply unsure that the Global Pact in its present draft form adds significantly 
to the legal panoply of environmental norms, hard or soft. Other commentators, such as 
Biniaz, have come to a similar conclusion: “[T]here is a legitimate question whether… 
[the Pact] would add value or might, in fact, end up simply creating legal confusion and 
negatively affecting existing legal regimes” (Biniaz 2017: 11). While it has some diplo-
matic and symbolic aspirations and relevance—often around the resigned view that any 
document is better than none—in its present form it does not constitute a firm foundation 
for inaugurating or embedding the type of paradigm-shifting global juridical regime that 
we critically need in the Anthropocene. Unless considerably revised and strengthened, it 
will at best be a broadly supported but weak agreement, and at worst will remain a stillborn 
initiative to be shelved alongside the numerous other failures of the legal fraternity in their 
efforts to address the mounting socio-ecological crisis we find ourselves in. Or is the oppo-
site true? Would it be worse that an inadequate document is entrenched, failing to reflect 
the necessary Lex Anthropocenae?
The Global Pact will undergo significant changes during the future negotiation process 
that might, or might not, lead to its eventual adoption. States therefore still have an oppor-
tunity to revise its content so that it more fully and forcefully provides for radical measures 
aimed at protecting Earth system integrity. It is our hope that it will be drastically revised, 
because in its present form, even if it were to be adopted by states as a binding document, 
there are genuine reasons to be concerned as to its normative effect.
These can be broadly grouped into three summary critiques. First, it does not provide 
a complete and normatively rich codification of current IEL. As noted above, there are 
principles which are absent, and for those that are included, they often fail to reflect fully 
present normative understandings. We believe a partial codification might be argued to be 
no codification at all. Second, the Pact fails to raise normative ambition to include new 
provisions. There are several innovative provisions that could have been included, such as: 
specifically replacing the anthropocentric orientation of the Pact’s provisions with an eco-
centric one; embedding a far more deliberate Earth system approach in all of the provisions 
of the Pact; supplementing the decades-old principles of IEL with principles such as in 
dubio pro natura, Earth system integrity and intra-generational and intra-species justice 
and equity; introducing binding obligations for non-state actors (particularly transnational 
corporations) that harm people and the environment; providing for the rights of nature; and 
introducing the concept of planetary boundaries as a minimum threshold or standard that 
IEL must strive to achieve and maintain. Though outside the Pact presently, these prin-
ciples are not as radical as they appear at first glance; many have already been broadly 
endorsed by the IUCN World Commission on Environmental Law in its 2016 World Dec-
laration on the Environmental Rule of Law (IUCN 2016).
And third, the provisions on monitoring, implementation, compliance and dispute set-
tlement seem particularly weak. Combined with almost no understanding as to how this 
Pact, as a treaty of general application, will coexist alongside other MEAs and rules of cus-
tomary IEL, there must be genuine questions not only as to what the Pact is for (an objec-
tive assessment), but also how (and whether) States might use the Pact to their own advan-
tage (a subjective assessment). As a means of regulating and promoting positive behaviour 
both of themselves and others, the Pact is largely silent.
In the Introduction, we also raised a further concern: the possibility that the Pact cre-
ates a false sense of security—that it would be retrogressive to entrench an inadequate 
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document which fails to reflect the imperative of new law, which we term Lex Anthropoce-
nae. It is to that we turn, briefly, in conclusion. Koskenniemi has noted that “[I]nternational 
law does not contain a ready-made blueprint for a better world that could only be ‘applied’ 
so as to bring about peace and justice. Instead it contains arguments and positions…” 
(Koskenniemi 2012: 59). We recognise the textual limitations of a Pact; that words alone 
cannot change behaviour. But we believe better words can prompt better behaviour. Sci-
entific reality and ethical reality are increasingly coalescing around the viewpoint that the 
present, traditional, state-bound law is insufficient. We do not as yet have an answer—there 
is no “ready-made blueprint”—but we would argue that the Pact could have an enormously 
important role to play in addressing the lacunae in the current normative system, to push 
for a more ambitious normative framework, and as a means to address systemic challenges 
and increase the normative power of ecological norms. We call this law the Lex Anthropo-
cenae. It is in evolution, it exists within those “arguments and positions”. Others might not 
share the same values and will dispute the necessity of such fundamental change. That is 
part of the discourse. We are increasingly of the view, however, that a “lex anthropocenae 
would provide a freedom for imagining both the process and purpose of reform beyond 
that which our present normative restrictions ordinarily permit” (French forthcoming). In 
reviewing the draft Pact, states will undoubtedly be aware of the reality that intergovern-
mental negotiations usually water down the starting document rather than increasing its 
normative strength, or viscosity. We fear the opportunity for radical inclusion may have 
already been lost. But there is another reality, that of ecological justice, which cannot be 
“applied” from without but must be argued over and won from within if documents such as 
the Pact are to begin addressing the perilous state of the Earth.
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